论( XIX,235-9 )
The manner in which our patients bring forward their associations during the work of analysis gives us an opportunity for making some interesting observations. ‘Now you’ll think I mean to say something insulting, but really I’ve no such intention.’ we realize that this is a rejection, by projection, of an idea that has just come up. Or: ‘You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother.’ We emend this to:‘So it is his mother.’ In our interpretation, we take the liberty of disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject-matter alone of the association. It is as though the patient had said: ‘It’s true that my mother came into my mind as I thought of this person, but I don’t feel inclined to le tthe association count.’
在分析工作中病人提及他们的联想的方式为我们做一些有趣的观察提供了机会。“现在你会认为我想说一些侮辱的事情，但事实上我没有那样的意图。”我们发觉这是一种拒绝(rejection)，是一种对刚才冒出来的想法的投射。或者：“你问谁可能是梦中的那个人。它不会是我母亲”我们对这进行修订：“所以那是他的母亲。”在我们的解释中，我们可以“冒昧地”忽略否认并且单独地挑出和主题有关的内容。这好像病人曾经说过“当我考虑这个人物时我母亲确实进入到我的头脑中，但是我觉得这不算数。”
There is a very convenient methodby which we can sometimes obtain a piece of information we want aboutunconscious repressed material. ‘What’, we ask, ‘would you consider the mostunlikely imaginable thing in that situation? What do you think was furthest fromyour mind at that time?’ If the patient falls into the trap and says what hethinks is most incredible, he almost always makes the right admission. A neatcounterpart to this experiment is often met with in an obsessional neurotic whohas already been initiated into the meaning of his symptoms. ‘I’ve got a newobsessive idea,’ he says, ‘and it occurred to me at once that it might mean so and so. But no; that can’t betrue, or it couldn’t have occurred to me.’ What he is repudiating, on groundspicked up from his treatment, is, of course, the correct meaning of theobsessive idea.
这是一个非常方便的方法，（通过这种方法）我们能够不时的获得一些我们想要的关于受压抑材料的一些信息。我们问道，“你认为在那种情景中最不可能想象的是什么?你觉得那时自己最不可能想到的是什么？”如果病人掉入陷阱并且说他认为最难以置信的是什么，他几乎总是做正确的坦白。与此类似情况是一个已经知道自己症状意义的患者，他说，我有了一个新的强迫观念，我会马上想到它可能意味如此如此。但不是，那不能是正确的，我不可能会想到这的。从他的治疗基础上我们知道他正在拒绝的，当然是强迫观念的正确意义。
Thus the content of a repressedimage or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it isnegated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed itis already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance ofwhat is repressed. We can see how in this the intellectual function isseparated from the affective process. With the help of negation only oneconsequence of the process of repression is undone - the fact, namely, of theideational content of what is repressed not reaching consciousness. The outcomeof this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at thesame time what is essential to the repression persists.【1】 In the course ofanalytic work we often produce a further, very important and somewhat strangevariant of this situation. We succeed in conquering the negation as well, andin bringing about a full intellectual acceptance of the repressed; but therepressive process itself is not yet removed by this.
因此，受压抑的图像或想法能够进入意识层面的条件是它被否认了。通过否认，我们认识到什么受到了压抑；否定是对受压抑之物的发现，但不意味着对其的接纳。在这个里面，我们可以看到智力功能（intellectual function）是如何和过程相分离的。在否认的帮助下，压抑过程的结果只有一个没有完成——也就是说，使被压抑的观念内容没有达到意识（这点没有完成）。这种结果导致一种理智上的可以对压抑接受，但与此同时什么压抑的核心依然在。在分析工作中关于压抑，我们经常发现一个更加重要，却也是以上所说的情境的变种的奇怪情况。我们也成功战胜否认，成功地使病人理智上接受受压抑的内容，但是压抑过程本身并没有通过这样而被移除。
Since to affirm or negate thecontent of thoughts is the task of the function of intellectual judgement, whatwe have just been saying has led us to the psychological origin of thatfunction. To negate something in a judgement is, at bottom, to say: ‘This issomething which I should prefer to repress.’ A negative judgement is theintellectual substitute for repression; its ‘no’ is the hall-mark ofrepression, a certificate of origin like, let us say, ‘Made in Germany’. Withthe help of the symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictionsof repression and enriches itself with material that is indispensable for itsproper functioning.
由于对思维内容进行肯定和否定的判断是智力的一项功能，我们已经谈及的这些将我们导向这种功能的心理起源。从根本上说，在一个判断中否认一些事情，实际上是在说：“这是我愿意压抑的。”一个否定（负性的）的判断是压抑的替代物；它的“不”不是压抑的品质证明，像一个证明的起源，就像我们说“德国制造”。在否认的帮助下，思维将自己从压抑的限制中解脱出来，并且丰富自己，从而运转正常。
The function of judgement isconcerned in the main with two sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms thepossession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputesthat a presentation has an existence in reality. The attribute to be decidedabout may originally have been good or bad, useful or harmful. Expressed in thelanguage of the oldest - the oral - instinctual impulses, the judgement is: ‘Ishould like to eat this’, or ‘I should like to spit it out’; and, put moregenerally: ‘I should like to take this into myself and to keep that out.’ Thatis to say: ‘It shall be inside me’ or ‘it shall be outside me’. As I have shownelsewhere, the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everythingthat is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, whatis alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical.【2】
判断的功能主要和两种决定有关。（其中的一种）通过某件事物的某种独特属性来肯定或者否定对该事物的占有；（另一种）断言或争议一种呈现（presentation，主观的）在现实中是否存在。（It affirms ordisaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it assertsor disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality.）用以做决定的属性可能从本质上来说就有好有坏，有用或者有害。用口欲期的本能冲动的语言来说：我应该喜欢吃这个，或者我应该吐出来那个；更普遍地讲，我应该喜欢把这些带进我自己，把那些留在外面。也就是说，某些将在我里面，另一些将在我外面。正如我在其他地方已经展现，最初的快乐（pleasure-ego）想吸取每件好的事情到它自身，同时驱逐每一件不好的事情。坏的，与自我孤立的，以及外部的，这些最开始都是一个意思。
The other sort of decision madeby the function of judgement - as to the real existence of something of whichthere is a presentation (reality-testing) - is a concern of the definitivereality-ego, which develops out of the initial pleasure-ego. It is now nolonger a question of whether what has been perceived (a thing) shall be takeninto the ego or not, but of whether something which is in the ego as a presentationcan be rediscovered in perception (reality) as well. It is, we see, once more aquestion of external and internal. What is unreal, merely a presentation andsubjective, is only internal; what is real is also there outside. In this stageof development regard for the pleasure principle has been set aside.
通过智力功能做出的另外一种决定——呈现的事物是否真实存在——是和有限的现实自我（the definitive reality-ego）有关的，这现实自我发展自快乐自我。现在的问题不是是否把感知到的某物吸收进自我，而是在自我中呈现的某物能否重新在现实中得到感知。我们看到，这再次是一个内在和外在的问题。不真实，仅仅是呈现和主观的，是内在的；真实的同时也是外在的。在这个发展阶段，快乐原则已经被放置一边。
Experience has shown the subjectthat it is not only important whether a thing (an object of satisfaction forhim) possesses the ‘good’ attribute and so deserves to be taken into his ego,but also whether it is there in the external world, so that he can get hold ofit whenever he needs it. In order to understand this step forward we mustrecollect that all presentations originate from perceptions and are repetitionsof them. Thus originally the mere existence of a presentation was a guaranteeof the reality of what was presented. The antithesis between subjective andobjective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the factthat thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once moresomething that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentationwithout the external object having still to be there.
经验告诉主体，一个有着“好”属性的物体是否值得被吸收进自我里，和这个物体是否外在于现实世界以使主体能在任何需要的时候摸到它，是同样重要的。为了进一步的理解，我们必须回忆起这样的事实：所有的来自于感知的呈现都是复制品。因此最初一个呈现的存在就是现实中某物存在的保证。在最开始，主观和客观的对立并不存在。只有当思维能够再一次将以前感知过的某物的呈现不断地带入我们的脑海时，主观和客观的对立才出现，这时外在不需要有真实的某物，而我们的头脑中却依然可以呈现。
The first and immediate aim,therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perceptionwhich corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, toconvince oneself that it is still there. Another capacity of the power ofthinking offers a further contribution to the differentiation between what issubjective and what is objective. The reproduction of a perception as apresentation is not always a faithful one; it may be modified by omissions, orchanged by the merging of various elements. In that case, reality-testing hasto ascertain how far such distortions go. But it is evident that a preconditionfor the setting up of reality-testing is that objects shall have been lostwhich once brought real satisfaction.
因此现实检测最重要的目的不是发现主观呈现和客观存在的某物相对应，而是重新发现某个物体，用这个物体来使主体相信自己头脑中的呈现依然在那里。思维作用的另外一个功能进一步加深了主观和客观之间的分离。头脑中的呈现并不一定忠于现实，它可能被遗漏，或被修改。在这种情况下，现实检测必须发现这种歪曲到达了何种程度。但明显的是曾经带给主体满足的事物如今已经不再。
Judging is the intellectualaction which decides the choice of motor action, which puts an end to thepostponement due to thought and which leads over from thinking to acting. Thispostponement due to thought has also been discussed by me elsewhere. It is tobe regarded as an experimental action, a motor palpating, with smallexpenditure of discharge. Let us consider where the ego has used a similar kindof palpating before, at what place it learnt the technique which it now appliesin its processes of thought. It happened at the sensory end of the mentalapparatus, in connection with sense perceptions. For, on our hypothesis,perception is not a purely passive process. The ego periodically sends outsmall amounts of cathexis into the perceptual system, by means of which it samplesthe external stimuli, and then after every such tentative advance it draws backagain.
判断（judging）是一项智力行动（intellectual action），它决定了感知运动行为（motor action），结束由思维（thought）造成的延迟，带来行动。由思维带来的延迟我已在其它地方做过讨论，它可被看做是试验性行动（experimental action），一种感知运动行为的触发（motorpalpating），只消耗一小部分的能量。让我们想想在某个其它地方自我曾用到过类似的触发装置，然后自我将其学到的技能用于思维（thought）。（这个“某个其它地方”就是：）在我们的心理器官（mental apparatus）的感觉末端，这感觉末端和我们的感知觉相连。在我们的假设中感知觉并非纯被动的过程，自我间歇性地将一定能量贯注于感知觉系统，通过这种贯注过程，自我才在外界刺激中取样（找到对照的对象），然后在这一试探性过程结束之后感知觉的这一过程也完成了。
The study of judgement affordsus, perhaps for the first time, an insight into the origin of an intellectualfunction from the interplay of the primary instinctual impulses. Judging is acontinuation, along lines of expediency, of the original process by which theego took things into itself or expelled them from itself, according to thepleasure principle. The polarity of judgement appears to correspond to theopposition of the two groups of instincts which we have supposed to exist.Affirmation - as a substitute for uniting - belongs to Eros; negation - thesuccessor to expulsion - belongs to the instinct of destruction. The generalwish to negate, the negativism which is displayed by some psychotics, isprobably to be regarded as a sign of a defusion of instincts that has takenplace through a withdrawal of the libidinal components. But the performance ofthe function of judgement is not made possible until the creation of the symbolof negation has endowed thinking with a first measure of freedom from theconsequences of repression and, with it, from the compulsion of the pleasureprinciple.
对判断的研究（the studyof judgement）或许是头一遭给我们提供了从主要的本能冲动（primary instinctualimpulses）的相互作用来看待智力功能（intellectual function）的源起。判断始自自我依据快乐原则将一些东西吸收进来而将另外一些东西排除出去这个原始的过程。而判断的两极性正好和我们所假设存在的两组本能的对立想对应。肯定——作为对结合（uniting）的替代——属于爱若；否定——排除的后继者——属于破坏本能。否定的一般愿望（general wish）——一些患表现出来的消极主义（negativism）——或许可以看做组力比多（libidinal components）后撤时发生的本能解离（a defusionof instincts）的信号。但是只有当否定的象征（the symbol of negation）被创造——此象征第一次使在压抑和快乐原则之中的思维有了一定的自由——此时判断才发生。
This view of negation fits invery well with the fact that in analysis we never discover a ‘no’ in theunconscious and that recognition of the unconscious on the part of the ego isexpressed in a negative formula. There is no stronger evidence that we havebeen successful in our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the patientreacts to it with the words ‘I didn’t think that’, or ‘I didn’t (ever) think ofthat’.
在分析中，我们在中从未发现过一个“不”字，而在自我这个角度来说对潜意识的识别主要是通过这样一个否定的公式（negative formula），这些都和我们以上的理论探讨相符合。在揭示潜意识方面，没有什么比病人口中的“不，我不那样想”或“我从未这么想过”更加有说服力的了。
——————————1 The same process is at the rootof the familiar superstition that boasting is dangerous. ‘How nice not to havehad one of my headaches for so long.’ But this is in fact the firstannouncement of an attack, of whose approach the subject is already sensible,although he is as yet unwilling to believe it.
2 See the discussion in‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915c).
1这个相同的过程本质上是常见的迷信即吹嘘是危险的。将不会遭受我的一种头痛如此长时间多么美好。尽管他至今仍不愿意相信它，但是这在事实上是对接近主题是明智的一次攻击的首次通告。
2参见《本能及其变化》的讨论
