Kernberg, O.F. (1982). Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives.

Kernberg, O.F. (1982). Self, Ego, Affects, and Drives. J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn., 30:893-917.内蒙古心理网*k,ais6?Qy

(1982). Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, IN WHAT FOLLOWS I SHALL EXAMINE certain issues having to do with the relation of the ego to the self, clarify my views on early development and structure formation, and suggest a modification of dual instinct theory. These issues will be explored with a particular focus on the psychopathology of narcissism and the classification of nonorganic psychopathology.内蒙古心理网qY8Or g,]wj?}

The Ego and the Self

Terminological Issues

A survey of the psychoanalytic literature on theories of the ego and concepts of the self reveals the existence of considerable terminological confusion. That the terms ego and self are sometimes used interchangeably, sometimes carefully distinguished from each other, and at other times treated ambiguously probably is due to the way used these words, the way Strachey translated them, and the subsequent elaborations made on them by others.

Freud preserved throughout his writings the German

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Medical Director, The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, Westchester Division; Professor of Psychiatry, Cornell University Medical College; Training and Supervising Analyst, Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research.

Presented at the panel on "Psychoanalytic Theories of the Self," at the Fall Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York, December, 1980.

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, reads, "the contrast between ego-love and object-love."

In the same work, Freud talks about the alliance between the analyst and the weakened Ich of the patient and says "the sick 'Ich' promises us the fullest honesty … we assure it strict discretion…"The German edition (p. 98) reads:内蒙古心理网K#t6{+v4L"evo.^1M

Der analytische Arzt und das geschwächte Ich des Kranken sollen, an die reale Aussenwelt angelehnt, eine Partei bilden gegen die Feinde, die Triebansprüche des Es und die Gewissensansprüche des berichs. Wir schliessen einen Vertrag miteinander. Das kranke Ich verspricht uns vollste Aufrichtigkeit, d.h. die Verfügung über allen Stoff, den ihm seine Selbstwahrnehmung liefert, wir sichern ihm strengste Diskretion zu und stellen unsere Erfahrung in der Deutung des vom Unbewussten Beeinflussten Materials in seinen Dienst.

The English translation (1940,  has it: "The sick ego promises us the most complete candour—promises, that is, to put at our disposal all the material which its self-perception yields it; we assure the patient of the strictest discretion and内蒙古心理网 C*k4O V4h2l

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, "On theother hand, if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something which would be objectionable to the super-ego, it feels raised in its self-esteem and strengthened in its pride, as though it had made some precious acquisition."

Naturally, there are innumerable examples of such uses of the word Ich before 1923, to designate subjective experience and self-esteem—what Rapaport might have critically designated the "anthropomorphization" of the concept ego. My point is that this characteristic—which I consider a strength, not a weakness of Freud's concept of Ich—persists throughout his entire work. The most dramatic example is probably his statement in Civilization and its Discontents(1930) where theStandard Edition, faithful to the German original, reads, "Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego" (p. 65).The German version says (G. W. 14, p. 423), "Normalerweise ist uns nichts gesicherter als das Gefühl unseres Selbst, unseres eigenen Ichs."Here self and ego are explicitly equated! Perhaps Freud's equation gave Strachey cause for some uneasiness, for it was precisely at this point that he inserted a footnote calling the reader's attention to his remarks

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, Strachey says:内蒙古心理网J.bB/Z"L%T{&xu

In a few places in the Standard Edition where the sense seemed to demand it, 'das Ich' has been translated by 'the self'. There is a passage inCivilization and its Discontents(1930), towards the beginning of the fourth paragraph of Chapter 1, in which Freud himself explicitly equates 'das Selbst' and 'das Ich'. And, in the course of a discussion of the moral responsibility for dreams (1925), p. 133, below, he makes a clear distinction between the two uses of the German word 'Ich'.内蒙古心理网]T0X/Q eBUT

But, pursuing the matter further, we find the following (p. 133): "what is unknown, unconscious and repressed in me is not my 'ego' …" with Strachey's footnote: "As Freud himself points out in the next paragraph, the German 'Ich' here stands for something more like the English 'self'." But the sentence Strachey is referring to in that next paragraph (which has to do with assuming responsibility for one's actions and says nothing about the ego and the self) states: "It is true that in the metapsychological sense this bad repressed content does not belong to my 'ego' … but to an 'id' upon which my ego is seated."

Strachey's effort to restrict the translation of Freud's Ich to "ego" has had an effect on our understanding of Freud'sthinking. I agree with Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), who, in their extensive discussion of this issue (pp. 131ff.), claim that Freud always maintained the ambiguity, the internal tension of his concept of the Ich—so fatefully translated into "ego" rather than "I" or "self"—to indicate its system properties as well as the fact that, as part of these system properties, the ego is the seat of consciousness and with it, the consciousness of one's self or of the self as a person.内蒙古心理网h%EY"h)S!E3sO9u

A second source of difficulty is the use of "self" to describe the person or individual interacting with other persons or "objects," as in Hartmann's (1950) statement:内蒙古心理网0\@6AbwHN6V

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The replacement of the topographical by the structural model of the psychic apparatus led Freud to examine the roots of the ego in the id, as a surface precipitation of it, and to the idea that the ego was dependent on the apparatus ofperception and consciousness. The ego became an apparatus of regulation and adaptation to reality simultaneously with its carrying out defensive functions and compromise solutions to conflicts between the id, superego, and external reality. The structural perspective apparently reduced Freud's emphasis on the functions of self-awareness and self-feeling, on self-esteem regulation with the ego, or rather, some of these functions were temporarily understood mostly in terms of intersystemic conflicts.

However, Freud also maintained an ambiguity in his concept of the origins of the ego, and it is no coincidence that object-relations approaches as well as contemporary ego psychology have their origin in his formulation of the structure of the ego. His much-quoted statement in The Ego and the Id(1923) is still pertinent:

When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego which can only be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego, as it occurs in melancholia; the exact nature of the substitution is as yet unknown to us. It may be that by thisintrojection, which is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for the object to be given up or renders that process possible. It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any rate the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object-choices [p. 29]

This is in consonance with Freud's (1914) paper "On Narcissism,"

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There are two aspects of Freud's (1923) formulations regarding the origin of the ego that have been elaborated and gradually integrated with contemporary psychoanalytic formulations regarding earliest development. The first is his ideathat the ego differentiates from the id or an original undifferentiated ego-id matrix by its crystallization around the system perception-consciousness. The second is his suggestion that the character of the ego is a precipitate, by means ofinternalization, of the representations of instinctually invested objects. That the infant's perception and consciousnessshould be particularly activated at times of his actual interactions with mother, and that evolving instinctual investments of her should leave traces in the early ego's field of consciousness, is probably a broad enough statement to cover very contrasting psychoanalytic approaches. The differences, however, between competing psychoanalytic approaches focus on a number of issues that lead us directly to current controversies regarding the origin of the self (as I have redefined it).

1. Can we conceive an infant's capacity to differentiate himself from mother from the beginning of life? Melanie Klein (1946) and her followers (Segal, 1979); (Fairbairn, 1954) within the British "middle group," clearly appear to think so. In contrast, Jacobson, Mahler, myself, and also  (1958), (1965) question this idea, and assume an initially undifferentiated stage.内蒙古心理网8Un9fOK

2. If an initially undifferentiated state of varying duration is assumed, does it contain a "purely narcissistic"primary omnipotent self-representation, or does it contain undifferentiated self-object representations? This question, apparently abstract, is nevertheless crucial, in my view, in terms of a contemporary metapsychology ofnarcissism.内蒙古心理网&_X0?BG1h/xYy

Jacobson (1964) proposed restricting the term primary narcissism to the undifferentiated stage of development which she saw as one of undifferentiated drive cathexes of the "primary psychophysiological self," marked only by states of rising and diminishing tensions. At the same time, she considered the内蒙古心理网e8vxD.i
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psychophysiological self a purely descriptive concept, unrelated to any further metapsychological considerations.

Jacobson saw the origin of the ego as intimately linked to the originally fused self-images and object images—to what I am calling the originally undifferentiated self-object representation in it. She saw this original fusedimage as invested by what, following Freud's terminology, she called "secondary narcissism." She here initiated what I think is the prevalent contemporary ego-psychology answer to this question, namely, that the first instinctual, particularly libidinal, investment is to an undifferentiated self-object representation. Later, the gradual differentiation of self- and object representations will determine a differentiated investment of libido(and aggression) as well. As differentiated self-representations and object representations are built up, so is libidinal investment in the self-representation and in the object representation.内蒙古心理网H.hC.A_
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With the differentiation of self and object, the investment of the external object is experienced as a continuation of the investment of the earlier, undifferentiated version of it. Object representations and external objects are now invested simultaneously and reinforce each other. This view, which contrasts with earlier psychoanalytic assumptions about a prolonged state of the infant's psychological isolation from the human environment, is reinforced by actual infant observation and the impressively early discriminatory reactions to environmental stimuli reflecting mother's interaction with him—more about this later.内蒙古心理网S N0rEW,ARJtI7~

Jacobson's formulation solves, in my view, the issue of the origin of instinctual investment of self and objects—the question of whether narcissism predates object investment or whether they occur simultaneously, and it linksstructure formation within the ego to the setting up of internalized representations of self and object as primaryorganizing substructures. It creates the basis for description of the vicissitudes of self- and object representations—multiple, contradictory, nonintegrated at first, gradually consolidating into integrated self- and object concepts.内蒙古心理网 L'aJQaw

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Jacobson's formulations contribute a theoretical background against which to view Mahler's (1979) research on autistic and symbiotic childhood psychosis—and on the stages of normal and abnormal separation-individuation. Mahler provides both direct observational and psychoanalytic data that permit one to trace the stages ofdevelopment Jacobson postulates.内蒙古心理网"V9gc_0l'f j'H ?t

However, Jacobson's pushing back the stage of "primary narcissism" to an assumed earliest phase of diffuse dischargeonto the "psychophysiological self" left obscure the issue of the origin and development of drives and theirrelation to instinctual investment of self- and object representations. Jacobson's formulation of self- and object investments assumes that the nature of libidinal and aggressive drives differs.内蒙古心理网-tgWZy(Udu

3. Still another question regarding the development of the ego and the self relates to the question of whether the self originates only from blissful states of merger with mother and their corresponding undifferentiated self-object representations, or whether it originates from the integration of such states with states of merger of self- and object representations under the impact of painful, frightening, frustrating, or even catastrophic experiences. This question is crucial because completely different developmental schemata evolve according to how one responds to it.内蒙古心理网2U1i.X SN5f

Probably all psychoanalysts who have dealt with this question would agree that the gratifying, blissful states constitute the core of the ego's self-feeling or self-experience. Some would go so far as to consider the building up of an integrated concept of the self on the basis of such early merger experiences as constituting the final, integrated, normal self.内蒙古心理网(\4M)Iz Q$i

In such a view, the normal self would reflect the appropriately toned-down derivative of the originally blissful merged self-object representation. According to this view, frustrating experiences and the aggression triggered by them would not be part of the original self, but part of the "not-me" experience, an external threat to the self, not intrinsically linked with it. Although内蒙古心理网NC%S bl7Ym:n

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has not actually formulated a comprehensive model of earliest development, his theory (1972), (1977) might fit this line of thinking. At a metapsychological level, this thinking permits omitting aggression from the structural analysis of ego and self-development.

The alternative concept is that self-development also occurs at times of heightened frustration and painful or traumatic experiences. Such experiences determine the building up of merged self-object representations under the aegis of frustrationand pain. These mental representations are invested with aggression. They will later evolve into frightening, aggressive, and devalued experiences of the self and into frightening, aggressive, sadistic representations of objects. They eventually lead to the existence of multiple contradictory self- and object representations that are a developmental challenge duringseparation-individuation, and explain the pathological fixation at the rapprochement subphase of development (Mahler, 1971) in which differentiated yet nonintegrated self-representations and contradictory representations of significant objects determine the syndrome of identity diffusion. In contrast, the normal integration of contradictory self- and object representations marks the transition from separation-individuation "toward object constancy."内蒙古心理网5C zy_]J'D G!\

This latter concept—of self-development under both libidinal and aggressive conditions—is common to Jacobson, Mahler, and myself, on the one hand, and also to Fairbairn and Klein; Winnicott's developmental model leaves the impression of a certain ambiguity in this regard. Because in Kleinian thinking the problem of self and object differentiation has hardly been explored (with the exception of a partial examination of this issue in one paper by Bick [1968]) the correlation of Jacobson's, Mahler's, and my views with Kleinian developmental schemata cannot really be achieved. Fairbairn's (1954)assumption of an integrated "pristine" ego from birth on raises other problems in terms of developmental timetables.内蒙古心理网!y7V1h`)dJ j:oi\
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Speaking metapsychologically, the concept of the origin of

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self-representations and self-experience under the impact of both aggressively and libidinally invested states of merger leads to conceptualizing the self as the product of the eventual integration of such contradictory self-representations and, in the process, of the corresponding integration of the derivatives of libidinal and aggressive drive investments as well. In fact, the proposed model conceives of the self as invested with both libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives fused or integrated in the context of the integration of their component self-representations. This model solves the puzzling question of how psychic-structure formation, self-development, and instinctual developments correlate. It also suggests an explanation for the concept of neutralization of drives (Hartmann, 1955).内蒙古心理网nt1A*F4g:c

The self, then, is an ego structure that originates from self-representations first built up in the undifferentiatedsymbiotic phase in the context of infant-mother interactions under the influence of both gratifying and frustrating experiences. Simultaneously the system perception-consciousness evolves into broader ego functions as well—the developing control over perception, voluntary motility, the setting up of affective memory traces, and the system preconscious. The self as a psychic structure originates from both libidinally and aggressively invested self-representations. It is, in short, an ego function and structure that evolves gradually from the integration of its component self-representations into a supraordinate structure that incorporates other ego functions—such as memory and cognitive structures—and leads to the dual characteristics implied in Freud's Ich.内蒙古心理网nwm Q9G7V

Motivational Forces: Drives, Affects, and Object Relations内蒙古心理网2mL&xfJVH

It is no coincidence that the controversies in psychoanalysis about the concept of the self are so closely linked with the controversies over instinct theory, particularly the nature and role of aggression in early development. Analogous to the reaction to Freud's discoveries regarding infantile sexuality that

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imputed to psychoanalysis a morbid concern with an exaggerated view of sexuality, Freud's dual instinct theory has not ceased to arouse strong cultural reactions against the concept of aggression as a basic instinct. Imputed to "orthodox" psychoanalysts is a generally distinct, harsh, aggressive outlook on life as well as on patients' difficulties. Kohut's(1971), (1977) developmental model, emphasizing the central nature of the development of the cohesive self—the motivational force of which is not spelled out and only implied as a self-generating maturational drive—is the latest of many psychological and culturalist psychoanalytic theories that explicitly or implicitly reject instinct theory, particularly aggression, and the fundamental nature of the biological basis of human development.内蒙古心理网g3Hex5t5k6JK

Perhaps a failure to re-examine instinct theory in the light of new neuropsychological and observational-developmental data, particularly an insufficient re-examination of the relation between affects and drives, has contributed to the uncertainty in our field regarding the motivational forces of earliest development, and the origin and development of drives as overall motivational systems. That this is more than a purely theoretical issue, directly relevant to the discussion of the origin and development of the self, and, therefore, of narcissism, should be evident from what I have said so far about the development of earliest self- and object representations in the context of infant-mother interaction. What follows is an effort to integrate findings from contemporary neuropsychological studies of affects and research on infant development with a revised formulation of the dual instinct theory.

Affective behavior strongly influences object relations from birth on (Izard, 1978); (Izard and Buechler, 1979). A central biological function of inborn affective patterns—with their behavioral, communicative, and psychophysiological manifestations—is to signal to the environment (the mothering person) the infant's needs, and to thus initiatecommunication between the infant and mother that marks the beginning of intrapsychic life (Emde et al., 1978). Recent research has surprised us with内蒙古心理网}r'Vs
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the description of a high degree of differentiation in infant-mother communications that is present from very early on(Hoffman, 1978). Neuropsychological theorizing now assumes the storage of affective memory in the limbic cortex which, as direct brain stimulation experiments indicate, permits the reactivation not only of the cognitive, but also of the affective aspects of past experience, particularly the subjective affective coloring of that experience (Arnold, 1970). Affects, operating as the earliest motivational system, are therefore intimately linked with the fixation by memory of an internalized world of object relations (Kernberg, 1976).

If we assume that affective memory structures reflecting pleasurable relations of infant and mother, in which self- and object representatiwww.nmgpsy.com内蒙古心理网